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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
EBBA E. FINLAYSON and ALLAN
FINLAYSON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

No. 7713

KENNETH BRADY and DONALD
B. .MILNE, partners doing business
as Brady-Milne Appliance Company,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF CASE
This suit was brought by the appellants, Ebba E. Finlayson
and Allan Finlayson, husband and wife, against the respondents,
Kenneth Brady and Donald B. Milne, partners doing business
as Brady-lvlilne Appliance Company, to recover the purchase
price of four gas space heaters purchased by the appellants
from the respondents, for breach of warranty, and for additional
damages for loss of rentals during October, November and
December, 1949, in the apartment house of the appellants
3
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where the heaters were installed. The respondents filed an
answer and counterclaim for the balance claimed to be due and
owing on the purchase price of the heaters but prior to doing
so, brought a separate suit (R. 52-61) upon the same theory
and for restoration of the porperty under a Writ of Replevin
(R. 65). The appellants in turn filed their answer and counterclaim (R. 76-80) and at the pre-trial hearing, the court ordered
the two cases consolidated for trial (R. 22-25).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the summer of 1948, the appellants were in the process
of constructing an apartment building situated at 466 Lindell
Lane in Sandy City, Utah (R. 115a). The building was a
fourplex, consisting of three four-room apartments and one
three-room apartment (R. 115a). Each apartment was designed to ~e heated with a separate gas space heater (R. 116).
Apartment No. 1 was located on the ground .floor, west side
of the building, apartment No. 2 on the ground .floor east,
apartment No. 3 in the basement under No. 2, and apartment
No.4 was likewise in the basement, under No. 1 (R. 144-145).
Two separate .flue chimneys were constructed in the building,
one on the East side to provide vents for apartments 2 and
3, and the other on the West side to vent the heating units in
apartments 1 and 4 (R. 121, 122, and 123).
One of the appellants, Mr. Finlayson, had known the
respondents for many years and first talked with one of them,
Mr. Milne, during the summer of 1948, and several times thereafter, regarding the purchase of the gas space heaters which
4
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is the subject matter of the controversy herein involved (R.
117, 152 and 153). At that time a gas application had been
made to the gas company and Finlayson was in the process
of securing a right of way for the installation of the gas line
to his apartment building (R. 117 and 119). Mr. Milne took
the appellants and their son to his place of business at Murray,
Utah, and showed them the heaters they were selling. Mr.
Finlayson recalls that these heaters were a Crosley brand, but
there is a conflict in the testimony on this point (R. 118, 119
and 202). About December 6, 1948, a written contract was
signed by Mrs. Finlayson, and Mr. Milne on behalf of the
appliance company. It was not dated as the gas was not yet
available in the Finlayson apartment building (R. 118, 119
and 12o-Plaintiff's Exhibit A). This contract covered the
purchase of four refrigerators, four cooking ranges, one washing machine, one water heater, and the four gas space heaters.
The ~urn of $340.00 was paid in cash and that amount indicated
as the down payment (R. 121-Plaintiff's Exhibit A). Some
three weeks later, another contract was signed by Mrs. Finlayson, and the appliance company, this time by Kenneth Brady
(Plaintiff's Exhibit B). The evidence is in conflict as to
whether this second contract was dated when signed. Mr.
Finlayson testified that it wasn't to be dated until the gas was
put in the premises and they were ready for occupancy (R. 121).
The same cash down payment was reflected in the second
contract, with a time balance of $1475.65 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit
B). Thereafter, the appellants made two payments, one for
$150.00 on January 17, 1949, and one on March 3, 1949, for
$140.00 (Plaintiffs' Exhibits C and D). Additional payments
in the total sum of $983.50 were thereafter made on the con-

s
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tract which had been assigned to the Sandy City Bank (R.
125, 126 and 127), leaving a balance on the contract of
$202.15 (R. 143).
The respondents, as the sellers of the gas heaters, agreed
to install the same, one in each apartment, as part of their
contract (R. 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 156, 157, 260,
261 and 289). This was done prior to the time the apartment
building was completed and the first time there was occasion
to use the heaters was in September, 1949 (R. 128). The
heaters leaked gas and all of the tenants moved because it was
impossible to have the heaters in operation due to their defective
condition (R. 128 and 129). In response to complaints by
Mr. Finlayson, the respondents removed the heaters in November, 1949, and had the collars inside of them welded to
alleviate the escaping gas (R. 129, 130, 250, 309 and ~~to
Plaintiffs' Exhibit E). As a result of this unsatisfactory situation, the appellants lost rentals in their apartment building
as follows: apartment No. 1, $130.00; apartment No. 2,
$130.00; apartment No. 3, $70.00; and apartment No. 4,
$~95.00. These losses, in the aggregate of $525.00, were for
the months of October, November and December, 1949 (R.
130, 131, 132, 158, 159, 160, 161 and 162). No claim is
made for losses occurring after December 31, 1949, as the
apartment building was sold on contract to Edwin H. Anderson
and Emma Anderson effective January 1, 1950 (R. 164 and
302). However, title was not to pass from the appellants
until payment of the contract in full, at which time a deed was
to be given.
After the collars on the heaters had been welded, they
6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

still continued to spill gas into the apartments and the gas
company made numerous. calls to the premises in an effort to
correct the situation. One tenant testified that she called the
gas company about fifteen times and that she experienced
severe headaches (R. 178, 179, 180 and 181). The other three
tenants likewise experienced trouble with these heaters and
finally in the latter part of October, 1950, the gas company
condemned them and capped off the gas supply, so the tenants
were without heat (R. 180, 181, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190 and
192). It was then determined that the diverters inside the
heaters were so designed that they permitted spillage of the
burned products of combustion back into the room rather than
diverting the fumes into the vent (R. 192, 193, 194, 198, 199,
280 and 281). The gas company recommended that the
baffles on the diverters in each heater be modified to eliminate
the spillage of gas fumes (R. 192, 193, 194, and 195-Plainti.ffs' Exhibit G). Mr. Finlayson called the Sandy Bank and
informed them that no further payments would be made on
the contract unless the heaters were replaced (R. 135, 1=6,
142 and 143). The heaters were again removed from the
premises, taken to the gas company's laboratory, and the diverters changed as recommended (R. 213, 214, 215 and 281).
After the heaters were returned to the apartments, it was
apparent that the two upstairs ones were still spilling fumes,
so the flue vents were raised by the respondents (R. 283 and
291). In January, 1951, the heater in apartment No. 4
exploded (R. 174, 175 and 176). This was apparently from
the malfunctioning of the orifice in the heater causing it to
clog, due to excessive corrosion (R. 177, 200 and 201-Defendants' Exhibit 10).
7
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At the conclusion of the trial the court directed a verdict
of no cause of action on the plaintiffs' complaint and further
directed that judgment be entered in the sum of $491.75 in
favor of the defendants and respondents, and for costs and
attorney's fees.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
The plaintiffs filed this appeal, and have designated and
included the entire record and all the proceedings and evidence
in the action, and in their appeal rely upon the following
points:
1. That the court below erred in directing a verdict in
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs.
2. That the court below erred in awarding attorney's fees

to the defendants where there was no breach of contract by
the plaintiffs.
3. That the court below erred in denying plaintiffs' motion
for a new trial.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed
in their burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that there existed any breach of warranty insofar as
the heaters were concerned. It is difficult to follow the trial
8
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court's conclusion in this respect particularly in the light of the
comments made at the conclusion of the trial wherein the
court said (R. 328):
"Second, under the contract of purchase was the
defendant Brady-Milne Appliance Company to make
installation of the equipment described in the complaint?

Well, there isn't any question they were to make that
installation, and they did make that installation.
·'The third question, was the installation of the said
equipment. properly made so as to avoid gas leaks;
I don't think there is any question that there was a gas
leak in there; no question in my mind but what the
installation there wasn't proper."
"Fourth, was the property described in plaintiff's
complaint reasonably fit for the purposes and uses for
which it was intended? I don't think it was. I think
they had to take it out and do some work on it before
it would work."
In view of the foregoing comments, it was overwhelmingly apparent from the evidence that there had been a breach
of contract on the part of the defendants both as to the installation of the heaters and the implied warranty as to their fitness
for the particular purpose for which they were required. We
submit that the case should have been submitted to the jury
under proper instructions from the court and that they as triers
of the facts, were entitled to determine the rights of the plainiffs in the light of all of the evidence. We contend that the
jury could have found that there was certainly a breach of
contract on the part of the defendants for the reasons above
9
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stated, and that by such breach of contract, the defendants could
not recover the purchase price of the heaters.
Under our system of jury trials it is the province of the
jury and not the court to determine all questions of fact and
to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses as they appear
before them and testify. The court determines and decides
q~estions of law and directs its application to the facts, but the
jury is to determine the disputed facts of the case from the
evidence adduced, in accordance with the instructions given by
the court. 53 American Jurisprudence, Para. 293, page 248.
Likewise, a cause should never be withdrawn from the
jury unless it appears, as a matter of law, that a recovery cannot
be had upon any view of the facts which the evidence reasonably
tends to establish. If there is conflicting evidence, and any
view that the jury might lawfully take of it will sustain their
findings for either party, the facts should not be withdrawn
from them. 53 American Jurisprudence, Para. 299, page 251.
Applying these principles to the instant case and viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we
respectfully submit that the plaintiffs sustained their burden of
proof in making a prima facie case and that the trial court
erred in directing a verdict in favor of the defendants.
Passing now to the question of warranties in the law of
Sales as applied to the heaters sold by the .defendants to the
plaintiffs, this court has recently considered such a proposition
in the case of Carver vs. Denn, 214 Pac. 2d 118, decided January
31, 1950. In that case the plaintiff brought suit for the purchase price of air conditioning equipment installed in the
defendant's place of business; the defendant pleaded a breach
10
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of warranty as to fitness in defense. This court in sustaining
the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendant said:
"It is apparent from the facts in this case that the
respondent was primarily interested in air-conditioning
his place of business, rather than in purchasing any
specific chattel. The plaintiff was aware that defendant
knew nothing about air-cooling equipment and he was
also aware of the fact that the principal object of the
negotiations and subsequent sale was to provide a
suitable cooling system for defendant's jewelry store

. . . The implied warranty of fitness for the particular
purpose is not negatived by the seller's use of a brand
name when it is used merely for convenience in identifying the equipment to be installed."
The court's attention is respectfully invited to HalesMullaly, Inc. vs. Cannon (Okla. 1941) 119 Pac. 2d 46. In
this case plaintiff filed suit in replevin for recovery of an
office air conditioner sold to defendant, who was a doctor. The
defendant counterclaimed setting up a breach of an implied
warranty and demanded damages for loss of time, fees and
patients due to plaintiff's mechanics working on the units in
defendant's office. The jury awarded a verdict in favor of the
defendant and plaintiff appealed. The court held that the
evidence as to the breach of the implied warranty was sufficient to submit to the jury the question as to whether the
machine was unfit for the purpose for which defendant purchased it, and said:
"It was incumbent upon plaintiff, by whom the
machine was installed, and to whom the place where
and the purpose for which defendant bought it were
11
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known, to ascertain, before installing the machine,
whether it would properly operate upon the electrical
voltage furnished in such building. This plaintiff did
not do. Defendant purchased the machine upon reliance upon plaintiffs assurance that it would work
properly in his office, and keep at least one room cool.
Therefore the implied warranty was for the particular
purpose. It is clear that the machine failed to properly
function.''
Battle Creek Bread Wrapping Machine Co. vs. Paramount Baking Co., 88 Utah 67, 39 Pac. 2nd 323.
Even the fact that an article has a trade-name does not
11egative an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose where it is purchased not necessarily by the name, but
for a paritcular purpose and supplied for that purpose. 55
c. J. 757.
Jones vs. Just, 23 English Ruling Cases 466:
"Where the manufacturer or dealer contracts to sell
an article which he manufactures or produces, or in
which he deals, to be applied to a particular purpose
so that the buyer necessarily trusts to the judgment or
skill of the manufacturer or dealer, there is in that
case an implied term of warranty that the article will
be reasonably fit for the purpose to which it was to be
applied."
Iron Fireman Coal Stoker Co. vs. Brown, 182 Minn.
399, 2~4 N. W. 685.
Pierce vs. Crowl, 190 P. 2nd 1003.
We believe the instant case comes squarely within the
provisions of sub-section ( 1) of Section 81-1-15 Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which provides:
"Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for which
12
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the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer
relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he
is the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit
for such purpose.''
This court in commenting upon this statute in the Carver
vs. Denn case, supra, said:
"The statute throws a partial cloak of protection
around a buyer who purchases an article for a particular
purpose when he must rely on the skill or judgment of
a seller to determine if the article will serve the purpose."
Greenland Development Corporation vs. Allied Heating Products Company, Inc., 164 A. L. R. 1312.
In the case at bar the· defendants undertook to sell to the
plaintiffs heaters which would be suitable for heating the
apartments in which they were installed by the defendants.
The defendants had been in the appliance business for some
six years (R. 23 7 and 305) . They had sold merchandise to the
plaintiffs on previous occasions (R. 238). They inspected
the premises in which the heaters were to be installed and
undertook the installation (R. 239, 240, 256, 257 and 258).
The heaters were to be connected to the main chimneys (R.
258). The plaintiffs relied upon the defendants to furnish
heaters suitable for the heating of the respective apartments.
The evidence plainly shows that the heaters were defective
from the beginning. The defendants endeavored to correct
the deficiencies by changing the design and also by welding
the collars inside the heaters. It is apparent that the plaintiffs did not receive what they bargained for in the purchase

13
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of the equipment and that they were entitled to an offset on
the contract for the purchase price of the heaters in the sum
of $336.00 (R. 142 and 143). The jury was also entitled to
consider evidence of the loss of rentals claimed directly as a
result of the malfunctioning of the heaters (R. 130, 131 and
132), as these additional damages flowed naturally from the
breach of warranty on the part of the defendants.

POINT II
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the trial court
erred in awarding attorney's fee in the sum of $200.00 to the
defendants where the~e was no breach of contract by the plaintiffs. The basis for such an allowance is contained in the last
sentence of paragraph 5 of the contract (Plaintiffs' Exhibits A
and B) . wherein it is provided:
"Purchaser agrees to pay all costs of collecting any
amount or enforcing any rights hereunder including
any expenses incurred, reasonable attorney's fees and
the cost of the time and services of any employees in
making collection.''
This court's attention is again respectfully invited to the
comments made by the trial court at the conclusion of the trial
wherein the court said (R. 328) :
"Did the plaintiffs breach the contract of purchase
by failing to pay the amounts required to be paid by
the contract? Well, I don't think enough so to let
this thing go just on that point. I think there was some
reason for his not paying, that this matter wasn't work14
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ing right, and he had a right to get it working properly
before he paid his money.·'
It must be remembered that the plaintiffs initiated action
against the defendants after they had exhausted all patience
with the manner in which the heaters had functioned. Then
for some unknown reason the defendants not alone filed an
answer and counterclaim to the plaintiffs' complaint, but filed
another distinct and separate suit themselves as party plaintiffs. From the foregoing comments of the trial court, it is
obvious that the record was devoid of any evidence which
would justify even the jury finding that the plaintiffs had "in
any way caused a breach of contract by their mere refusal to
continue making payments when the heaters purchased were
so obviously defective. However, at best it was a question of
fact that should have been submitted to the jury under proper
instructions from the trial court. At the risk of appearing
repetitious, we invite the court's attention to the testimony
of Owen Despain, assistant cashier of the Sandy City Bank,
who appeared for the plaintiffs (R. 225 to 23 7). He asserted
that the only periods during which the plaintiffs were delinquent
in their payments under the contract were when they had been
granted a deferment in the Spring of 1949 (R. 226) or when
they refused to pay by reason of their dissatisfaction with the
equipment that had been delivered, and the manner of installation (R. 227, 234 and 235-Plaintiffs' Exhibits E and F).
This the plaintiffs had a right to do in view of the defective
heaters and the efforts on their part to exert the defendants to
exchange them for ones that would be reasonably suitable for
the heating of the apartments, the purpose for which they were
purchased.

15
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In the light of the evidence, we respectfully conclude that
the trial court was in error in entering judgment on the contract and in awarding attorney's fees to the defendants.

POINT III
Even though this was a trial by jury, the trial court signed
and filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment, the same having been submitted by defendants'
counsel (R. 41 and 45). The plaintiffs' motion for a new
trial came on for hearing and at that time objection was made
by plaintiffs' counsel to the Findings and Judgment which
had been filed. The trial court ordered the same withdrawn
and directed that a Judgment on Verdict be substituted (R. 49).
The Verdict and Judgment on Verdict were then prepared
and signed, nunc pro tunc, the clerk of the court merely signing
the jury foreman's name as follows: "Meldo F. Dixon, Foreman, by Richard C. Diblee" (R. 46 and 47.) This we believe
to be an abuse of the court's discretionary power as certainly
there was no statutory right to direct that the jury foreman's
name be signed by other than the jury foreman himself.
We believe this situation to be governed by the provisions
of Title 104-30-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which provides:
"When trial by jury has been had judgment must
be entered by the clerk in conformity to the verdict,
within twenty-four hours after the rendition of the
verdict, unless the court orders the cause to be reserved
for argument or further consideration, or grants a stay
of proceedings. Other judgments must be entered im16
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;.

mediately after the order therefor or the filing of the
decision of the court."
In the instant case, the statute above quoted required that the
verdict be signed by the jury foreman and the court was afforded
no discretionary power to order the judgment entered. The
statute required that the clerk enter the judgment in conformity
with the verdict and as this procedure was not followed, the
judgment was a nullity.
As was said by this court in the case of Ellinwood vs.
Bennion, 73 Utah 563, 276 Pac. 159:
"When trial is had by jury, the judge or court does
not render or sign a judgment, but judgment must be
entered by the clerk in conformity to the verdict."
Accordingly, it is respectfully urged that the judgment
so entered was void and a new trial should have been granted
on this point alone.

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that each of the points of error
is well taken and should be sustained, that the decision of the
trial court was erroneous and should be reversed, and judgment
entered for the plaintiffs upon their complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
F. ROBERT BAYLE,
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants
17
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